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The Trade Secret Quagmire -
A Proposed Federal Solution
I. INTRODUCTION
For almost a century American courts have prohibited the im-
proper acquisition and use of trade secrets in an effort to enforce
meaningful standards of business morality. However, in their at-
tempt to formulate a code of business ethics, the courts have
failed to recognize the needs of a changing society. The law which
developed in the context of the small, self-contained community
is outmoded when applied to the modern integrated national
economy. Although the focus on commercial conduct is laudable,
the effect of existing trade secret law on the national interests has
been more detrimental than beneficial. Because of its inordinate
complexity, the law of trade secrets is unpredictable even within a
particular jurisdiction. As a result, trade secret owners are over-
protected, often at the expense of their employees, and always to
the ultimate detriment of society. In the absence of legislative
guidance, the courts have been unable to formulate satisfactory
criteria for balancing the parties' rights. Moreover, the interests
of the general public have been virtually ignored. This Note will
explore the major defects in the present law, analyze the interests
involved, and suggest a fundamental revision of trade secret
protection.
11. THE PRESENT LAW
Trade secret law has used a variety of legal theories: Property
rights;' express2 or implied" contract; tort;4 agency;" breach of con-
fidence or trust; and equitable considerations of unfair compe-
L. E.g., Abalene Exterminating Co. v. Oser, 125 N.J. Eq. 829, 5 A.2d 738
(Ch. 1989).
2. E.g., Vitro Corp. of America v. Hall Chem. Co., 292 F2d 678 (6th Cir.
1961).
3. E.g., Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 876 (7th Cir. 1953).
4. E.g., Sun Dial Corp. v. Rideout, 29 NJ. Super. 361, 102 A.2d 90, aff'd,
16 NJ. 252, 108 A.9d 442 (1954); RESTATEmmEN, TORTS § 757 (1939).5. E.g., Rubner v. Gursky, 21 N.Y.S.2d 558, 46 US.P.Q. 157 (Sup. Ct.
1940).
6. E.g., E. I. duPont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100(1917).
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tion.7 However, regardless of the label used, liability requires both
a subject matter capable of protection and improper appropriation
by another s
Anything which bestows an economic advantage on its holder
and which is not readily ascertainable by willing exploiters may be
capable of protection 9 This includes "any formula, pattern, device
or compilation of information which is used in one's business... -,"o
The ideas expressed in a shaving cream formula," a hydraulic gar-
bage compressor, a collapsible fishing pole,'" the structural de-
sign of a tape recorder,14 a secret pricing list, 5 and customer lists"8
have all been considered trade secrets. However, these business
intangibles are not protectible per se. Unlike the holder of a
patent who has a monopoly, a trade secret owner is only protected
against those who acquire or use his secret under circumstances
found to be contrary to fair commercial moralityY Since liability
requires improper conduct, any protection afforded the secret is
merely incidental. Thus, an independent discoverer may use the
idea freely.'
7. E.g., La France v. Hart, 8 Conn. Supp. 286 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
8. This proposition accurately reflects the general theory of trade secret
protection. Since the purpose of this Note is an analysis of the major problems
in trade secret law, exceptions and technicalities have not been enumerated.
For a more detailed treatment, see 2 CAwazANw, UFAm COMiPETrTxoN AND
TRADE-MARKs ch. 14 (2d ed. 1950); Ezias, TRADE SECRETS (1953); TunR,
TRADE. SECRETS (1962). -
9. See Stedman, Trade Secrets, 23 Onro ST. LJ. 4 (1962); Note, 64 HARV.
L. REV. 976 (1951).
10. RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 757, comment (b) (1939).
11. Carter Prods. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 130 F. Supp. 557 (D. Md.
1955), af'd, 230 F.2d 855 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 843 (1956).
12. Kamin v. Kuhnau, 2 Ore. 139, 374 P.2d 912 (1962); Hyde Corp. v.
Huffines, 158 Tex. 566, 314 S.W.2d 763, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 898 (1958).
13. Wissman v. Boucher, 150 Tex. 326, 240 S.W.2d 278 (1951).
14. Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d
134 (9th Cir. 1965).
15. Simmons Hardware Co. v. Waibel, 1 S.D. 488, 47 N.W. 814 (1891).
16. Abalene Exterminating Co. v. Oser, 125 NJ. Eq. 829, 5 A.2d 788 (Ch.
1939). For a discussion of this special area of trade secret law, see 9 CALMUNN,
op. cit. sup'a note 8, § 55(c)(2) (1950, Supp. 1965); ELis, op. cit. supra note
8, ch. 7.
17. In Tower Mfg. Co. v. Monsanto Chem. Works, 20 F.2d 886, 887
(S.D.N.Y. 1927), the court said: "The outstanding difference is that a pafentee
has a monopoly as against all the world, while the owner of a secret process
has no right, except against those who have contracted, expressly or by impli-
cation, not fo disclose the secret, or who have obtained it by unfair means."
18. See, e.g., E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d
904, 911 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
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In determining whether a claimant has a protectible interest
the courts consider such factors as whether the secret is known
outside of his business, the steps taken to retain the secret nature
of the information, the value of the information to both himself
and his competitors, the investment in developing the informa-
tion, and the difficulty in acquisition and duplication by others."
These factors, however, are too indefinite and are not uniformly
applied. Some courts have held that publication of the idea in a
trade journal" or knowledge of it in another country21 destroys
the requisite secrecy. Others have ignored the fact that the idea
was disclosed in an expired patent22 or well known outside the
local market,23 and have focused on whether or not the idea was a
secret as far as the appropriator was concerned.2 This is an undis-
guised technique for finding liability when the court is particularly
displeased with the appropriator's conduct.2 5 There are similar
problems with the criteria of investment in development28 and
difficulty of duplication. 7 Consequently, any standard is mean-
ingful only in the context of a multitude of variant factors and
affords little basis for predicting whether the disputed matter will
be protected.28
Given subject matter capable of protection, the other determi-
nant of liability is the nature of the defendant's conduct. This is
considered in light of the relationship, express or implied, between
the trade secret owner and the person to whom the secret has been
divulged. 9 The manner in which the trade secret is disclosed is
crucial since the owner's rights will be protected only when he
makes a disclosure under circumstances indicating that he intends
to keep the information confidential. Commercial exploitation
19. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 757, comment (b) (1939).
20. Cornell-Dubilier Elec. Corp. v. Aerovox Corp., 71 U.SIP.Q. 153 (Mass.
Sup. Ct. 1946).
21. See Braverman v. De Stephano, 77 U.S.P.Q. 26 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1948).
22. See Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953); Franke v.
Wiltschek, 115 F. Supp. 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
23. See Kamin v. Kubnau, 232 Ore. 139, 874 P.2d 912 (1962).
24. See Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953).
25. See Arnold, Problem., in Trade Secret Law, A.B.A. SECTION OF PATrmT,
TmauimErm & COPYRIGHT LAw 248, 261-62 (Proceedings 1961).
26. See TunNuE, op. cit. -upra note 8, at 107-10.
27. See Junker v. Plummer, 320 Mass. 76, 67 N.E.2d 667 (1946).
28. See TuaNnn, op. cit. 8upra note 8, at 8.
29. An actual personal disclosure to an employee is not necessary. CALL-
mAm, op. cit. supra note 8, at 819. See generally TuRNmF, op. cit. supra note 8,
at 287-96.
30. CALLIUNW1 , op. ctt. supra note 8, at 803.
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usually requires disclosure to employees or to parties who wish
to purchase, license, manufacture, or market the secret or some
product embodying the secret. Disclosure in these contexts raises
a confidential relationship between the parties. Failure of the
disclosee to honor this relationship is the conduct which trade
secret law attempts to regulate' 1 Thus an employee cannot work
for a competitor"2 or go into business for himselP8 and thereby
disclose or use the trade secrets of his former employer. The holder
is also protected if he is induced to disclose his secret on the pre-
text that the disclosee intends to represent the product84 or enter
into a licensing agreement. 5
Unprotected disclosure occurs through voluntary publication
of the secret in technical or trade journals, patent file, advertising
material, or any other disclosure which is inconsistent with an
intention to maintain secrecy. 6 The product itself may disclose
the secret. Thus one is entirely free to purchase a competitor's
product on the market, analyze or "reverse engineer"3 7 it to deter-
mine its contents or construction, and enter into direct competi-
tion with an identical product. 88
If the ultimate user of an appropriated trade secret is a third
party, his rights and liabilities turn generally on when he dis-
31. See E. I. duPont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100
(1917). "[T]he starting point for the present matter is not property or due
process of law, but that the defendant stood in confidential relations with the
plaintiffs .... These have given place to hostility, and the first thing to be
made sure of is that the defendant shall not fraudulently abuse the trust re-
posed in him." Id. at 102.
82. Dollac Corp. v. Margon Corp., 164 F. Supp. 41 (D.NJ. 1958). For a
discussion of restrictive agreements, see Blake, Employee Agreement8 Not to
Compete, 78 HAv. L. REv. 625 (1959); Note, 87 I- .L.I. 218 (1961).
83. See Head Ski Co. v. Kam Ski Co., 158 F. Supp. 919 (D. Md. 1958).
Compare Adolf Gottscho, Inc. v. American Marking Corp., 35 NJ. Super. 33,
114 A.2d 19 (1954), aff'd, 18 N.J. 467, 114 A.2d 438 (1955), with Adolf
Gottscho, Inc. v. Bell-Mark Corp., 79 NJ. Super. 156, 191 A.2d 67 (1963).
34. See Franke v. Wiltschek, 115 F. Supp. 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
35. See Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 158 Tex. 566, 814 S.W.2d 763, cert. denied,
358 U.S. 898 (1958).
36. See Klein, The Technical Trade Secret Quadrangle: A Survey, 55 Nw.
U.L. RFv. 437,441 (1960); Stedman, supra note 9, at 6-8.
37. See Heyman v. A. R. Winarick, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1962),
aff'd, 325 Fad 584 (2d Cir. 1963); Schaefer, Inc. v. Mohawk Cabinet Co., 165
F. Supp. 688 (N.D.N.Y. 1958). Reverse engineering is the process of analysing
a product, formula, etc., to discover its components or process of development.
Tabor v. Hoffman, 118 N.Y. 80, 23 N.E. 12 (1889).
38. See Houser v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 202 F. Supp. 181 (D. Md. 1962);
Carver v. Harr, 132 N.J. Eq. 207, 27 A.2d 895 (Ch. 1942).
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covered that the secret was wrongfully taken. If he knew or
should have known of the confidential relationship, he is held in
pari delicto with the disclosee 9 If he acquires the secret in good
faith and without knowledge of the appropriation, there is no
liability until he has notice of the wrongful taking.40 In addition,
he may not be liable for use, even after he has notice if he has
so changed his position that any liability would be "inequitable."41
A variety of remedies is available to the injured plaintiff. At
law he can get damages for deceit,4 compensatory damages for
breach of contract4'5 either express or implied, punitive damages, 4
and costs. In equity, the common remedy is either a temporary45
or permanent" injunction. The injunction may restrain use or
disclosure of the trade secret,47 or compel surrender of the embodi-
ments of the trade secret48 or a sublicense on patents procured to
perfect a patent on the appropriated trade secret. 9 Other equita-
ble remedies include: Specific performance of a contract not to
compete 0 or to reveal trade secrets; 51 an express or constructive
trust leading to an accounting;52 award of a reasonable royalty
for use; 8 reconveyance of the trade secret;5 4 rescission of the em-
39. See Servo Corp. of America v. General Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 716, 725
(4th Cir. 1964).
40. See Vulcan Detinning Co. v. American Can Co., 75 NJ. Eq. 542, 73
At. 603 (Ct. Err. & App. 1909).
41. IESTATmENT, TORTS § 758(b), comment (e) (1939).
42. OPPExinnm, UNFAm TRA"E PRAcTicES 522 (1950).
43. Spiselman v. Rabinowitz, 270 App. Div. 548, 61 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1946).
44. McDonald's Corp. v. Moore, 243 F. Supp. 255 (S.D. Ala. 1965).
45. Space Aero Prods. Co. v. R. E. Darling Co., 238 Md. 93, 208 A.2d 74
(1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1966).
46. A. 0. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531 (1934),
modified, 74 Fad 934 (6th Cir. 1935).
47. E.g., Space Aero Prods. Co. v. R. E. Darling Co., 238 Md. 93, 208
A.2d 74 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1966).
48. Ernst Slide Fastener Co. v. Stamberg, 120 N.Y.S.2d 311 (Sup. Ct.
1953); see CAr Luq, op. cit. supra note 8, § 59.2; OPPEN Ii, op. cit. supra
note 42, at 522.
49. Seismograph Serv. Corp. v. Offshore Raydist, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 342
(E.D. La. 1955).
50. Junker v. Plummer, 320 Mass. 76, 67 N.E.2d 667 (1946).
51. See, e.g., Stone v. Goss, 65 NJ. Eq. 756, 55 AUt. 736 (Ct. Err. & App.
1903).
52. Englehard Indus., Inc. v. Research Instrument Corp., 324 F.2d 347
(9th Cir. 1963) (dictum).
53. Kamin v. Kubnau, 232 Ore. 139, 374 P.2d 912 (1962).
54. Pen Carbon Manifold Co. v. Tomney, 90 NJ. Eq. 233, 110 Atl. 445
(Ct. Err. & App. 1920).
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ployment contract if still in force; and excusing an obligation to
pay the employee's compensation for services rendered. 5 In addi-
tion, the appropriator may be subject to criminal sanctions 5
While the foregoing represents a general survey of trade secret
law, it should be noted that each state has been free to fashion its
own rules. Also, the federal courts have developed their own body
of trade secret law to some extent. The federal law developed
prior to Erie R.R. v. Tompkins5 7 is currently applied when a trade
secret issue arises as a related claim to patent infringement. 58
This law has also influenced post-Erie state law. Although federal
courts do defer to state law in diversity actions, they often assume
that state law is the same as federal law and discuss the problem
in terms of equitable federal doctrines.59
III. EVALUATION
Trade secret law has not successfully regulated business con-
duct. Its fundamental weakness is its inherent uncertainty. The
standard of conduct, developed on a case by case basis, only re-
flects each court's philosophy of commercial morality.30 Despite a
century of development in this country,61 trade secret law cannot
tell an employee how much of his knowledge and skill is his own
and how much is a restricted trade secret of his employer. Con-
versely, the employer hires a potential law suit with each new
technically skilled employee. Legal advice becomes either vague
55. See Cornale v. Stewart Stamping Co., 129 N.Y.S.2d 808 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
56. See, e.g., N.Y. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A: 119-5.1-.5 (1965); N.Y. REVISED PEN.
CODE § 155.30(3); PENN. STAT. ANx. tit. 18, § 4899.2 (1965). See also 7 BosToN
COLT GE I DusTRIAL & CoummcL, L. REv. 324 (1966). It has been suggested
that although criminal sanctions may be desirable for acts of intentional
espionage, they are a constant threat to the "innocent" appropriator. Certainty
of definition is equally as difficult as in civil cases. See Arnold, Trade Secrets,
9 IDEA 161, 165-69 (1965); Harris & Siegel, Protection of Trade Secret: Initial
Report, 8 hEA 360, 372 (1964).
57. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
58. E.g., Carter Prods. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 130 F. Supp. 557 (D.
Md. 1955).
59. See Note, 66 1ARv. L. REv. 1094, 1105 (1953); cf. Note, 60 H.&v. L.
REV. 1315, 1317 (1947).
60. "But the tendency of the law ... has been in the direction of enforcing
increasingly higher standards of fairness and commercial morality in trade.
The tendency still persists." RESTATEMMNT, TORTS ch. 35, at 540 (1938). See
also Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d
13, 138 (9th Cir. 1965).
61. The two earliest cases reported are Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452




or unreliable as the courts mix varying definitions of trade secret
law with their own notions of equitable conduct.6 2 In one case,O
an employee had worked for the plaintiff eight years, devoting
half his time to analyzing and improving upon competitors' prod-
ucts. The employer later sought to enjoin the employee from
using his knowledge, claiming it was a trade secret of the em-
ployer. The court, in denying relief, found this knowledge be-
longed to the employee. However, another court, on identical facts,
held an implied confidential relationship had been created and
protected the discoveries as trade secrets of the employer."'
A second criticism of trade secret law is its use of injunctions.
Some courts, following the rule of Shellmar Prods. Co. v. Allen-
Qually Co., 5 grant broad permanent injunctions. They stress the
inequitable conduct of the defendant as the determining factor 6
It is irrelevant that the secret became known during trial, 7 after
trial," or that the information could have been obtained from a
legitimate sourceP9 Once information is disclosed in secret, it al-
ways retains a confidential status on the theory that a person
cannot discover the same thing twice. 0 A permanent injunction
prevents the defendant from using what is in fact public knowl-
edge.71 Also, an injunction may give the owner a virtual monopoly
because no one else may be willing to risk an entry into the plain-
tiff's market 2
62. See, e.g., Atlantic Wool Co. v. Norfolk llls, Inc., 357 F.2d 866 (1st
Cir. 1966). See generally Arnold, supra note 25, at 272.
63. Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 160 A.2d 430 (1960).
64. Extrin Foods, Inc. v. Leighton, 202 Misc. 592, 115 N.Y.S.2d 429 (1952).
65. 87 F.Rd 104 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 695 (1936). See Hyman
& Co. v. Velsicol Corp., 123 Colo. 563, 233 P.2d 977, cert. denied, 342 U.S.
870 (1951); McKinzie v. Cline, 197 Ore. 184, 252 P.2d 564 (1953).
66. See, e.g., Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953).
67. See A. 0. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531 (6th
Cir. 1934).
68. See Head Ski Co. v. Kam Ski Co., 158 F. Supp. 919 (D. Md. 1958).
69. See Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 375 (7th Cir. 1953), where
the court stated that the Pennsylvania test was how the defendant learned the
secret, not whether he could have obtained it from a legitimate source.
70. Shellmar Prods. Co. v. Allen-Qualley Co., 87 F.2d 104, 110 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 301 U.S. 695 (1936). See generally TuRmNE, TRAOE SECanES 454
(1962).
71. "[A]nyone except appellant could have infringed it if he desired to do
so . . . [but] by its inequitable conduct appellant has precluded itself from
enjoying the right of the general public to the patent disclosure. .. ." Shellmar
Prods. Co. v. Allen-Qualley Co., 87 F.2d 104, 108 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
301 U.S. 695 (1936).
72. In Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 158 Tex. 566, 314, S.W.2d 763 (1958), the
enjoined defendant was producing the product before the judgment. But see
1966] 1055
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Other courts will not grant an injunction if the information is
not secret at the time of trial.7- The confidential relationship rests
on the secret nature of the disclosure; if there is no secret, there
can be no confidence - and no protection. This approach, known
as the Conmar rule (Conmar Prods. Corp. v. Universal Slide Fas-
tener Co.74), has three variations. Under the first variation the
court will grant an injunction which will be dissolved when the
secret becomes public through unprotected disclosure.75 The sec-
ond variation allows an injunction for the remainder of the esti-
mated time it would have taken a competitor to reverse engineer
and market his own product.7 This puts the owner in the same
position he would have been had the secret never been appropri-
ated. Under this rationale, when a product is marketed it is as-
sured the same period of protection from the defendant as it would
have from analysis and use by any other competitor. The third
variation of the Conmar rule sanctions an injunction running from
the time of judgment for the entire estimated period of time it
would take to reverse engineer and market the product.7 7 This
results in protecting the owner from the appropriator even though
the product has in fact been reverse engineered by another com-
petitor.78
Injunctions create further difficulties under either the Shellmar
or the Conmar rules. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, sub-
stantially duplicated in many states, 79 provide that an injunction
"shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the
complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be re-
strained ... ."80 Yet trade secret injunctions are usually drawn in
Wissman v. Boucher, 150 Tex. 826, 240 S.W.ad 278 (1951), where the same
court denied an injunction in a similar situation on grounds that it would be
essentially the same as an agreement not to compete, and thus unenforceable
as being in restraint of trade.
73. See Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493, 500-09 (2d Cir. 1953) (dissent-
ing opinion); Connar Prods. Corp. v. Universal Slide Fastener Corp., 172 Fad
150, 155-56 (2d Cir. 1949); cf. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 821, 329-30
(1944).
74. 172 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1949).
75. Space Aero Prods. Co. v. R. E. Darling Co., 288 Md. 93, 125, 208 A.ad
74, 91 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 848 (1966). Of course the enjoined party
cannot increase the publicity of the secret by his own disclosures.
76. Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.ad
134 (9th Cir. 1965). This time period includes everything necessary to actually
market the product.
77. Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc., 38 Ill. 2d 879, 212 N.Ead 865 (1965).
78. Id. at 212. N.E.2d at 869-70.
79. See, e.g., TExAs R. Cirv. P. 683; KzwmcKy Civ. Rm 65.02.
80. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d).
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such vague terms that the enjoined party has no way of knowing
their scope. 1 An injunction against using "any device like the
plaintiff's device"'82 is injunction by way of example. It not only
protects the secret features of plaintiff's device, but the incorpo-
rated public ideas as well. Similarly, an injunction against "using
in any way the confidential information obtained by defendants
from an examination of plaintiff's [product] ' 83 is injunction by
reference. Since the "confidential information" is never defined,
the injunction is certain to protect more than the plaintiff's trade
secret.
The typical justification for the use of broad language in such
injunctions is based upon a fear of disclosing the plaintiff's se-
crets.84 It also has been asserted by way of justification that the
defendant knows what he has done wrong and can act accord-
ingly.85 Other cases have suggested that trade secret definition
may be too difficult for the courts who find it "impracticable if
not impossible"8 6 to enumerate all the secrets that the defendant
learned from the plaintiff. The uncertainty stemming from the
issuance of vague injunctions has resulted in grants of broader
protection than is legally justifiable. Without specific guidance,
the defendant may be forced to forego utilization of legitimate
information which might possibly be related to the protected
secret. The defendant cannot be certain that activity which he
considers to be legitimate will be so viewed by the court which
has previously issued an injunction to protect the plaintiff's secret.
The major criticism of trade secret law stems from the courts'
primary concern with the interests of the immediate parties and
their failure to evaluate objectively the societal impact of the
81. See Arnold, Problems in Trade Secret Law, A.B.A. SEcTiON OF PATENT,
TRADEI&ARK & COPYRIGHT LAW 248, 253--55 (Proceedings 1961).
82. In Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 158 Tex. 566, 814 S.W.2d 763 (1958), the
defendant was restrained by perpetual injunction from "manufacturing or
selling any device made substantially in accordance with any feature of a
garbage compressor described in [plaintiff's] original 'application for a
patent' ..... "Id. at 569, 314 S.W.2d at 765.
83. K & G Tool & Serv. Co. v. G & G Fishing Tool Serv., 158 Tex. 594,
608, 314 S.W.2d 782, 791 (1958).
84. See, e.g., Pomeroy Ink Co. v. Pomeroy, 77 NJ. Eq. 293, 78 Adt. 698
(Ch. 1910).
85. See Ungar Elec. Tool, Inc. v. Sid Ungar Co., 192 Cal. App. 2d 398, 13
Cal. Rptr. 268 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961): "Appellants complaint that the injunc-
tion here is too broad is ill-founded when it is considered that the. matters
treated by the injunction are matters within the peculiar knowledge of the
appellants ... ." Id. at 404, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 272.
86. Head Ski Co. v. Ka= Ski Co., 158 F. Supp. 919, 924 (D. Md. 1958).
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law. 7 Trade secret law is law for the entrepreneur. On one side is
the trade secret owner. In order to capitalize on the time, money,
and effort invested the owner must disclose his secret. He expects
that disclosure to be protected. On the other side is the potential
appropriator who desires the freest access to commercially ad-
vantageous innovations. Trade secret law is ostensibly designed
to balance these conflicting interests. However, this balancing
process has often neglected other public interests.
The most serious injuries occur where the dispute involves an
employee of a trade secret owner.88 If the secret is clearly that of
the employer, the courts have little difficulty in protecting it.
The problem arises in distinguishing the job skills of the techni-
cally skilled employee from the protectible trade secrets of his
employer s9 In making this distinction the court is forced to con-
sider equally undesirable alternatives: Either the employee is
restrained from using his best skills; or the employer finds his
trade secret in the hands of a competitor. Resort to the policies
favoring either party fails to suggest reasons why either side
should have the benefit of any presumptions. The result is an
ad hoc determination of many cases. The uncertainty regarding
the employee's job skills, coupled with the threat of vague in-
junctive relief, reduces the employee's mobility and bargaining
power 0 Employers are unwilling to hire an employee whose skills
may be the trade secret91 of a former employer. Specialization has
made the problem more acute. Public policy would seem to favor
87. See Adolph Gottscho, Inc. v. American Marking Corp., 18 NJ. 467,
114 A.2d 438 (1955):
We are not here concerned with any claim of patent infringement nor
are we concerned with the rights of the public generally.. . . [Defend-
ant's] conduct was grossly improper and gave rise to the plaintiff's
cause of action, based on long-settled equitable principles and sup-
ported by the marked changes in the attitude of the law towards the
need for commercial morality.
Id. at 474-75, 114 A.2d at 442.
88. See Arnold, supra note 81, at 265-68; Developments In The Law-
Competitive Torts, 77 ThuRv. L. REV. 888, 950-58 (1964); Note, Industrial
Secrets and the Skilled Employee, 38 N.Y.U,. REv. 324, 334-43 (1963).
89. Compare Van Prods. Co. v. General Welding & Fabricating Co., 419
Pa. 248, 213 A.2d 769 (1965), with Head Ski Co. v. Kam Ski Co., 158 F. Supp.
919 (D. Md. 1958).
90. See Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 850
F.2d 184, 187 (1965).
91. In order to avoid trade secret actions, DuPont has a policy of placing
new employees in departments unrelated to the employees' specialization with
former employers. Fortune, July 1964, p. 242.
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technological advance through specialization of the labor force.
Now, however, the skilled employee who wishes to change jobs or
to become self-employed runs the risk of disclosing secret informa-
tion of his former employer. As specialization increases, it becomes
more difficult to classify the employee's skills accurately.2 The
employer may then use the uncertainty of the law to restrict the
employee. Not only is the individual employee affected, but also
society is deprived of the optimum technically skilled labor
force. Furthermore, preventing the employee from starting his
own business or joining his employer's competitors reduces com-
petition.
Under the present approach to trade secret protection, the in-
terests of society suffer on a broader scale as well. The only public
policy the courts expressly consider is the enforcement of some
standard of commercial morality. Yet, the courts have failed to
consider the losses resulting from the secrecy which the present
law encourages. To qualify for protection, the owner is required to
keep his secrets not only from the public and his competitors, but
also from his own employees, parcelling out information on a need-
to-know basis." The resulting aura of loyalty and secrecy lowers
employee incentive, inhibits the free interchange of basic research,
duplicates effort, and creates a demand for industrial espionage.
4
From an economic standpoint, reverse engineering, duplication of
research, and costly security systems 5 are all wasteful diversions
of resources. Society must ultimately absorb these losses in higher
costs and in a slower rate of technological advance.
The last fundamental criticism of trade secret law is that it
frustrates the federal patent policy. The Constitution gives Con-
gress power to promote the useful arts and sciences by granting
limited protectionf0 Congress has emphasized the interests of the
public by enacting the patent laws. Rewarding the inventor is
92. See E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. American Potash & Chem.
Corp., 200 A.2d 428 (Del. Ch. 1964); B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 137
U.S.P.Q. 389 (Ohio C.P.), rev'd in part, 117 Ohio App. 493, 192 N.E.2d 99
(1963). See generally Note, 51 VA. L. REv. 917 (1965).
93. See Harris & Siegel, Protection of Trade Secrets: Initial Report, 8 IDEA
361 (1964).
94. See Note, 38 N.Y.UL. REv. 324, 326 (1963). Estimates of loss to com-
panies due to industrial espionage have been placed at two billion dollars
annually. Steel, Mar. 29, 1965, p. 28; N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1965, p. 53, col. 6.
95. See Note, 38 N.Y.U.L. 1REv. 324, 326-28 (1963); Bus. Week, Oct. 31,
1964, pp. 154-58.
96. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
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only a secondary consideration.O The grantee's ideas must ad-
vance useful knowledge and there must be disclosure so that the
protected ideas may be freely used by the public at the expiration
of seventeen years95 Thus, patent law is protected disclosure
which confers immediate benefits on the innovator and the ulti-
mate benefits on society.
Trade secret law, however, is protected secrecy. The only true
beneficiary is the trade secret owner, who is in fact over protected.
The incongruity of approach is highlighted in actions for patent
infringement which include an alternative claim for trade secret
violation. 9 If the patent is invalidated, the owner may still get
equivalent relief under trade secret law.00 All information con-
tained in an invalidated patent enters the public domain, and is
usable by anyone except the adjudged trade secret appropriator.' 01
Another conflict with patent policy exists when an idea em-
bodied in an expired patent is protected as a trade secret.0 2
The grant of a monopoly entitles the public to unrestricted use
upon termination of the period of protection. Nevertheless, the
defendant cannot use this public "secret" if he learned of it in
a confidential relationship rather than from the public records. °8
Furthermore, a system of protected secrecy allows the owners of
patentable innovations to avoid the impact of public disclosure.
Thus there is an incentive to rely on secrecy and escape the dis-
closure condition of patent protection, particularly where the
product is incapable of reverse engineering.10 4 This diminishes the
97. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942); Griffith Rubber
Mills v. Hoffar, 313 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1963); Interstate Bakeries v. General
Baking Co., 84 F. Supp. 92 (D. Kan. 1948).
98. 35 U.S.C. J 119 (1964), as amended, 35 U.S.C. § 112 (Supp. I, 1965).
See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 258 Fad 124 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 884 (1958); Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co.,
326 U.S. 249, 255 (1945) (person cannot contract to give up right of free use).
99. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
asserting a claim of unfair competition when joined with a substantial and
related claim under the copyright, patent or trade-mark laws." 28 U.S.C. §
1338(b) (1964).
100. See, e.g., A. 0. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d
531 (6th Cir. 1934).
101. Cf. Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 158 Tex. 566, 314 S.W.2d 763 (1958)
(dissenting opinion).
102. E.g., Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1953).
103. Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1953). But see Luccous v.
3. C. Kinley Co., 876 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. 1964), where the patentee unsuccess-
fully sought protection for his own expired patent under trade secret law.
104. Over one-half of all issued patents in litigation are invalidated. S.
REP. No. 1464, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1956).
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effectiveness of the patent laws because the innovator can avoid
the choice between disclosure and loss of protection. If the secrecy
can be maintained, protection could exist for longer than seven-
teen years. The public may be deprived of the benefit indefinitely.
Because of the unpredictability of trade secret law, the owner, by
use of either threats of litigation or enforcement of a broad, vague
injunction, is afforded greater protection for his idea than is the
patentee who must meet a high standard of innovation and who
must litigate within the scope of his patent claims. 0 5 The recent
case of Sears, Roebucw & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,'°6 suggests that the
United States Supreme Court is becoming more sensitive to
encroachments on the federal patent policy. In Stiffel the plain-
tiff's design and mechanical patents were invalidated; nevertheless,
the lower court protected the plaintiff's product against use by
the defendant under a state unfair competition law prohibiting
copying. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the state law
conflicted with the federal patent system. In the companion case,
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting Co.,107 the Court indicated
that the copier's motives were irrelevant'0 8 While these decisions
have not been construed to apply to trade secret law in general, 0 9
the language and rationale used by the Court suggest that it will
reject a result under trade secret law which frustrates patent
policy.
IV. THE NEED FOR REFORM
While there has been increasing criticism of trade secret law,10
few constructive proposals have been advanced. One simplistic
suggestion has been to amend the Lanham Trademark Act"' to
give exclusive common law jurisdiction to the federal courts. The
105. See Arnold, supra note 81, at 256.
106. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
107. 876 U.S. 234 (1964).
108. Id. at 288.
109. See, e.g., Servo Corp. of America v. General Elee. Co., 837 F.2d 716,
724-25 (4th Cir. 1964); Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc., 33 Il. 2d 379, 212
N.E.2d 865, 868 (1965). But of. Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining
& Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1965), where the court relied on Stiffel to re-
ject the contention that trade secrets are protectible per se.
110. Mlein, The Technical Trade Secret Quadrangle: A Survey, 55 Nw.
U.L. REv. 437 (1960); Knoth, The Protection of Unpatented Ideas and Inven-
tions, 32 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 268 (1950); Lunsford, Unfair Competition: Uni-
forJ State Act Needed, 44 VA. L. Ruv. 583 (1958); Marcuse, The Protection
of Trade Secrets, Theory and Practice, 36 CoNN. BJ. 848 (1962).
111. 60 Stat. 427 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1964).
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federal courts could then develop a consistent body of law, and
the problems of drafting comprehensive legislation would be
avoided. Although this approach may produce uniformity, it does
not insure certainty. Since this proposal would incorporate in. toto
the present rationale of protected secrecy, an employee still will
not be able to evaluate the legal consequences of his job skills.
Any party to whom business information has been disclosed will
still be unable to assess his potential liabilities. Worst of all, the
courts probably would continue to ignore the public interest.
A statutory system of protected disclosure analagous to patent
law has also been suggested. Although many feel that all-inclusive
legislation would be virtually impossible,"2 one commentator has
suggested possible criteria." 3 This plan would allow some statu-
tory protection for registered information which does not meet
patent standards. Such a statute would permit independent dis-
covery. Wrongful appropriators would be penalized by exacting a
royalty or other compensation. Injunctions would not be allowed.
Finally, protection would not extend to unregistered information.
Contract rights would not be recognized beyond the fixed period
of protection. The problems of constitutionality, scope, and ad-
ministration of such a statutory scheme should be evaluated in
terms of "the present confusion, ambiguity, frequently inequitable
results and, most of all, the undesirable side effects to which our
present law of trade secrets contributes, in terms of the strong
pressures to be secretive rather than to make data public .... ,,1
4
An analysis of trade secret law seems to support reorganization
along the lines of protected disclosure, a change which can only be
accomplished by statute. Federal rather than state legislation is
necessary to insure uniformity and to avoid possible federal pre-
emption problems. The constitutionality of federal legislation
could be based on the commerce clause," 5 patent clause," 0 and
treaty power.117 While the complexity of the commercial system
makes detailed legislation impossible, a statute drafted in terms
of general limitations could resolve the majority of the critical
problems and yet leave room for constructive judicial develop-
ment in accordance with the uniform policy expressed in the
statute. This integration of legislative and judicial direction could
112. See Arnold, supra note 81, at 270.
113. Stedman, Trade Secrets, 23 Omo ST. LJ. 4 (1962).
114. Id. at 34; see Note, 38 N.Y.U.L. R v. 324, 347-49 (1963).
115. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
116. Ibid.
117. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2.
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encourage the free use of information and dissemination of valu-
able ideas, while retaining enough protection to assure commercial
exploitation.
The following statutory proposal attempts to reconcile all
interests involved by raising standards of protectibility, limiting
the period of protection, and restricting available remedies. Its
desired effect is to benefit society by encouraging disclosure, and
to assist parties directly involved with trade secrets by improving
the certainty of the law.
V. AN ACT REGULATING TRADE SECRETS
SECTION 1. DEFIImTION
A trade secret under this act is any device,
invention, process or idea which is not
generally known by members of any trade
willing to use it and which gives its holder
a competitive advantage.
Comment: This definition does not modify the present law except
for the qualification that secrecy must extend to any trade willing
to use it. Even though information may be new or secret in one
trade, it will not be protected if it is freely used in another trade.
The word "generally" allows a court to deny protection when the
information is available from a legitimate source, and yet grant
relief when the information is not legitimately available.
SECTION 2. PROTECTION ArFoRDED SECRETS
UNDER Tmis ACT
(a) Trade secrets which are discoverable
through reverse engineering.
Subdivision 1. A trade secret which can be
reverse engineered when it is marketed
shall not be appropriated and used before
expiration of its secrecy. For purposes of
this subsection, secrecy expires upon pub-
lication by the owner or an independent
discoverer, or upon termination of the
period of time it would have taken to re-
verse engineer and market the owner's
trade secret, or five years, which ever oc-
curs first.
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Subdivision 2. A third party may not use
an appropriated secret after receiving rea-
sonable notice of the appropriation unless
he has innocently changed his position so
as to make any action inequitable.
Subdivision 3. Violation of this subsection
gives the injured party a right of action for
treble damages against the appropriator
or, if actual damage cannot be proven,
reasonable punitive damages may be
awarded.
Comment: Under this subsection the holder will not get the broad
protection presently available because the right to protection ex-
pires at the end of the statutory period. Unless five years have
elapsed, or the secret has been published by an independent dis-
coverer, the court must determine that both the appropriation
and the use occurred before a distinterested third party would
have been able to achieve the same results. It follows that the
owner can claim no injury after the time in which an independent
party could have embodied the secret in his own product. A party
who has reason to believe that he may be using the secret of an-
other will have an opportunity to analyze his position and to
sacrifice an early market entry for the assurance that his ultimate
production will not be in breach of trust. This subsection does
not change the present law regarding the liability of third parties.
Because damages often will be speculative, especially if suit
is brought before the expiration of the secrecy period, punitive
damages are likely to be the rule. The court will award punitive
damages based on the nature of the appropriator's conduct 1
118. In awarding punitive damages under this section, the courts should
be primarily concerned with adequately compensating the plaintiff. Punishing
the defendant should only be incidental. See Lucas v. Michigan CJ.R., 98
Mich. 1, 56 N.W. 1089 (1893); Ten Hopen v. Walker, 96 Mich. 236, 55 N.W.
657 (1893). In effect, this will allow the courts to use a more liberal standard
as in analogous cases where compensation for a plaintiff's injuries can not be
accurately estimated. See McChesney v. Wilson, 132 Mich. 252, 93 N.W. 627
(1936); Bixby v. Dunlap, 56 N.Z. 456 (1876). Also, the court should consider
all the relevant facts in making its determination. See Gaither v. Meacham,
214 Ala. 343, 108 So. 2 (1926).
Punitive damages have been awarded under CAL. Civ. CoDE § S294, for
the appropriation of customer lists. See, e.g., Sandler v. Gordon, 94 Cal.
App. 2d 254, 210 P.2d 314 (1949).
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Damages need not exceed a reasonable royalty, but this is not
mentioned as a limitation.
Injunctions will not be available even if an intentional theft
is involved since the resulting competition will benefit society and
possibly may even benefit the originator. The entry into the mar-
ket of additional producers may increase the sales of all producers
because of the additional advertising and communication to the
public1 9 This may also cause earlier acceptance of the product
by the public.
(b) Industrial, mechanical and chemical proc-
esses which are not disclosed by the holder be-
fore registration, or by the product which they
produce; and, trade secrets which cannot be
reverse engineered.
Subdivision 1. If registered either as a
patent which is later held invalid, or as a
trade secret by the discoverer, subject
matter under this subsection shall not be
infringed for a period of five years from
the date of application for registration.
Application for registration shall be made
within one year of discovery or develop-
ment, or within one year of the effective
date of this statute.
Subdivision 2. A violation of this subsec-
tion for which an injunction for the re-
maining period of protection is inadequate
shall give rise to an alternate claim for
treble damages. In any infringement action
the court may award punitive damages
appropriate to the existing facts.
Subdivision 3. Use of subject matter regis-
tered in accordance with this subsection
shall not constitute infringement under
119. See Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. PoL. EcoN. 213,
220-24 (1961); Telser, Advertising and Competition, 72 J. PoL. EcoN. 537,
550 (1964). The traditional view of advertising is that in fact it reduces
competition because a copious advertiser can corner the market for his prod-
uct. This idea has been criticized on the ground that competition is actually
increased. See Advertising Age, Oct. 11, 1965, p. 3, col. 4; Telser, supra, at
541-51. It can also be argued that any increase in competition at an early
stage will inhibit monopolistic tendencies.
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this act if the subject matter or product
developed from it is not used in competi-
tion with the registrant, his heirs, as-
signees, or licensees.
Comment: Subsection (b) makes a significant change in the exist-
ing law. Innovations which cannot be reverse engineered are
granted an exclusive statutory monopoly in exchange for dis-
closure. To obtain protection the holder must register the secret
and permit public use after the period of protection. Information
may be kept secret through internal control. But the trade secret
owner will be encouraged to disclose either through a public
registration system established pursuant to this act, or through
the patent office. Failure to register a secret which could not be
reverse engineered would preclude relief for its loss, whether
through independent discovery or theft. This subsection affords
enough protection for even the smallest company to maintain
a substantial investment in developing products and processes.20
At the same time, the high standard of innovation required should
avoid the dangers of granting monopolies to low class innova-
tions."' The threat of commercial extortion by individuals hoard-
ing unique ideas will be eliminated.
This subsection also modifies patent law. Patented innovations
which are invalidated qualify for protection under this subsection
if they cannot be reverse engineered. Since patent application
involves substantial risks for the inventor, there has been an in-
Scentive to withhold secrets which do not disclose themselves and
to rely instead on trade secret law for protection. Under this act,
120. The five year period of protection is used arbitrarily for purposes
of illustration. What the proper term of protection should be is a determina-
tion for the legislature.
121. The potential dangers of granting monopolies to low class innovations
is a standard consideration in patent law.
It was never the object of those laws to grant a monopoly for every
trifling device, every shadow of a shade of an idea, which would natu-
rally and spontaneously occur to any skilled mechanic or operator in
the ordinary progress of manufactures. Such an indiscriminate creation
of exclusive privileges tends rather to obstruct than to stimulate inven-
tion. It creates a class of speculative schemers who make it their busi-
ness to watch the advancing wave of improvement, and gather its foam
in the form of patented monopolies, which enable them to lay a heavy
tax upon the industry of the country, without contributing anything
to the real advancement of the acts.
Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 200 (1882).
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there will be no protection without disclosure. This subsection
will encourage the innovator to apply for a patent and thus dis-
close his invention by granting an adequate period of protection
for commercial exploitation despite the invalidation of the patent.
Injunctive relief is allowed under this subsection. The five year
limitation eliminates the possibility of perpetual monopoly by
injunction. Since the claimant must now litigate within the scope
of his registration or patent claim, the problem of the vague
injunction should be greatly reduced.
Subdivision 3 limits infringement to persons or products in
competition with each other. This will allow independent discov-
ery and use if it will not injure the registered party. Although
large companies will find this subdivision advantageous, the prin-
cipal beneficiaries will be the small companies which need to invest
in research free from the threat of discovery and registration by
other firms.
(c) Customer Lists.
Where the holder of a customer list has
manifested an intent to keep it secret,
such customer list shall not be appro-
priated and used if it contains information
which is of a personal nature or is being
held confidentially between customer and
dealer. Names of customers are not pro-
tected. An injunction or treble damages
may be awarded for a violation of this
section along with reasonable punitive
damages.
Comment: This subsection affords injunctive relief for customer
lists while limiting the protection to information of a high classi-
fication. For the sake of competition, customer names are, ex-
plicitly excluded from protection. Because of the difficult nature
of the problems which deal with countless types of business firms,
the courts must exercise wide discretion in resolving the facts
while keeping the intent and purpose of the statute in mind.
(d) Undeveloped ideas and know-how.
Subdivision 1. An undeveloped idea is
one which is not substantially ready to be
utilized if it is to be used in a product or
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process; or, if the idea is of such a nature
that it can be readily marketed after dis-
covery, it must be so used or it shall be
unprotected.
Subdivision 2. Undeveloped ideas and
knowhow not covered under subsections
(a) or (b) may be protected against ap-
propriation and use for a period not ex-
ceeding a reasonable 'time for their devel-
opment or exploitation. A reasonable time
may extend to the limit of protection
under another appropriate section of this
act. The court may provide any remedy
that circumstances demand and which is
in keeping with the purpose of this act.
Comment: Undeveloped ideas and know-how which do not fall
within an explicit part of this act are given limited protection. But
this protection should not exceed any other protection which
would be allowed if the idea were substantially developed. This
subsection serves as an all inclusive provision for the many prob-
lems which are difficult to cover with specific legislation.
(e) Restrictive covenants, licensing agreements,
and other express and implied contracts regulat-
ing the disclosure and use of trade secrets.
Subdivision 1. No agreement or part of an
agreement between an employer and em-
ployee regulating the disclosure of trade
secrets under this act shall be effective
either after termination of employment or
the expiration of any other period of pro-
tection under this act for that class- of
secret, whichever occurs later.
Subdivision 2. LAcensing or royalty agree-
ments forbidding disclosure or use of a
secret shall be unenforceable after the
period of protection for that secret has
expired under this act.
Comment: This subsection insures that the secret will not get
longer protection through private agreement than under the act.
It establishes a definite position from which the parties can bar-
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gain. No implied relationships should be inferred from any dis-
closure preceding the agreement. Under subdivision 1 of this
subsection, the employer may be able to extend protection for
his secrets by the payment of postemployment "salary for serv-
ices rendered" in order to delay the termination of employ-
ment.1 While this device has some support from the bar,123 it
should be held to a high standard of reasonableness to prevent
the impairment of employees' earning power and mobility.
(f) Attorney's Fees.
In addition to any other relief granted, the
court may award reasonable attorney's
fees to a party injured through a viola-
tion of this act.
Comment: This subsection has two purposes. It eliminates reluc-
tance to sue because of the cost of litigation. It also deters willful
violation because the injured party will be more willing to sue and
the possibility that an unsuccessful defense may be very costly.
The taxing of fees is not mandatory, and its allowance should be
based on the nature of the violator's conduct.
(g) Pre-Emption by act.
Except as provided in this act, no protec-
tion shall be afforded trade secrets under
any other theory of law or equity.
Comment: This subsection, together with section 4, establishes
that this act completely pre-empts all prior law governing trade
secrets.
SECTION 3. OTHER ACTS OF UNFAm COmPETITION
RELATING To TRADE SECRETS
(a) Any party who uses another's trade secret
or that which was previously a trade secret shall
122. A postemployment agreement not to compete might provide for the
annual payment for three years of 25% of the employee's last annual salary
in exchange for "consultation services." From the employer's standpoint, such
payments represent much cheaper protection for his trade secrets than does
costly litigation. On the employee's side, this "bonus" will compensate him
when he is forced to take lower pay in order to get a job that will not require
his restricted skill.
123. See Arnold, supra note 81, at 269-70; Blake, Employee Agreements
Not To Compete, 73 HARv. L. REv. 625, 688 (1960).
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be enjoined from passing off his subsequent
product as containing any part of that secret.
(b) Any other utilization of the goodwill of a
previously held trade secret in order to promote
the use or sale of a subsequent competitive prod-
uct shall be enjoined by court order.
Comment: Section 3 is aimed at restricting the intentional use of
advertising or other sales promotion to pass off a subsequent
product as containing the equivalent components of formula of
previously held trade secrets. For example, if the formula for
Coca-Cola were divulged, it would be impermissible to advertise
a product as containing the same formula. It would also be a
wrongful act to announce that the same formula were being used
but that it had been improved.
SECTION 4. JURISDICTION
The federal courts shall have exclusive jurisdic-
tion over all cases arising under this act.
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